以下是对内容的翻译： 这段对俄罗斯工程师和企业家 Siddegay 的采访，他正在开发军用无人机，从俄罗斯的角度坦率而深刻地展现了无人机战争不断演变的局面。对话突出了俄罗斯在乌克兰冲突初期在无人机技术上的滞后，以及随后在很大程度上由私营部门推动的赶超努力。 Siddegay 强调，俄罗斯军方最初低估了无人机的重要性，这反映了全球对这种战争形式缺乏准备。他强调了部署在乌克兰的许多西方无人机的无效性，称美国的“弹簧刀”（Switchblade）是“十足的垃圾”，并批评波音公司开发的“扫描鹰”（Scan Eagle）使用廉价材料制造。相比之下，他赞扬乌克兰制造的无人机性能优于西方同类产品，尽管它们使用的组件与中国无人机相同。 他将乌克兰无人机的成功归功于其系统的易用性，这使得私营开发商可以直接与军方合作。这促进了前线快速原型设计和创新，而这一过程在俄罗斯受到阻碍。 当被问及俄罗斯和乌克兰系统与中国系统在无人机开发方面的比较时，他强调，这两个国家现在都处于无人机开发的领先地位。然而，尽管中国生产这些系统中的许多无人机组件，但这些系统的成品却远不如它们。他特别指出，中国人缺乏真正的战争经验。中国制造的武器感觉更像是玩具，在面对真正军事硬件的严酷考验时缺乏实用性。 这次采访深入探讨了无人机战术的具体方面。Siddegay 描述了远程布雷（remote mind-laying），即无人机在敌人认为安全的道路上投掷地雷，这是一种非常有效的战术。他还讨论了“睡眠无人机”（sleeper drones）或“伏击无人机”（ambush drones），例如在库尔斯克地区，一辆乌克兰车辆被无人机摧毁。当使用光纤无人机时，这种战术最有效，因为这些系统的能量输出低，可以潜伏而不被发现。尽管该系统最初有效，但操作员会迅速适应战场变化。 Siddegay 还详细阐述了“互联网桥梁”（internet bridge）的概念，该概念允许位于远离前线的操作员（甚至在莫斯科）远程控制无人机。这降低了熟练无人机飞行员的风险，他们通常不适合前线作战，但却是宝贵的资产。 另一个话题是臭名昭著的乌克兰“巴巴亚嘎”（Babayaga）无人机，这是一种经过改装的重型农业无人机，用于投掷反坦克地雷。这些无人机可以有条不紊地摧毁防御工事和地堡。俄罗斯军方最初对这种无人机不屑一顾，但事实证明它们非常有效。作为一种对策，俄罗斯人一直在使用带有热成像瞄准镜的机枪。他们可以通过热成像瞄准镜追踪无人机，并且可以轻松击中在红外线下发光的无人机的电池和电机。现在，俄罗斯正在使用中国组件开发自己的重型无人机，但生产需要时间。他还讨论了他对无人机未来发展的看法。他说无人机将不断发展，并且在自主目标识别和制导方面将会取得重大进展，因为干扰系统会造成问题。 他解释了“Gerundrons”无人机，这种无人机起源于伊朗，但现在已经发展成一种新的东西。这些系统现在具有隐形涂层。他还分享了他对拦截无人机的看法。他说乌克兰方面已经开发了使用以色列雷达系统的这类无人机。这些系统有效地击落了俄罗斯的无人机，导致俄罗斯人开发了对付这些威胁的对策。 为了对付无人机，Siddegay 表示，从一名步兵的角度来看，用于步枪的反无人机弹药、树木繁茂的地形、智能移动和速度将是最有价值的。他驳斥了激光系统，并表示激光有点像笑话。 总之，Siddegay 希望俄罗斯政府在战后能够接受私营部门在推动无人机技术创新方面发挥的作用。他承认俄罗斯国防部门内部有许多敏锐而有能力的人，但强调私营公司天生更具灵活性和动力。尽管他相信自己无论在无人机领域内外都会成功，但他对在无人机开发中构建军事工具充满热情。

This interview with Siddegay, a Russian engineer and entrepreneur developing military drones, provides a candid and insightful look into the evolving landscape of drone warfare as seen from the Russian perspective. The conversation highlights Russia's initial lag in drone technology at the start of the Ukrainian conflict and its subsequent efforts to catch up, largely driven by the private sector. Siddegay emphasizes that the Russian military underestimated the importance of drones early on, mirroring a global lack of preparedness for this kind of warfare. He highlights the ineffectiveness of many Western drones deployed in Ukraine, citing the American Switchblade as "total garbage" and criticizing the Scan Eagle, developed by Boeing, as built with cheap materials. In contrast, he praises Ukrainian-made drones for outperforming their Western counterparts, despite being made with the same components found in Chinese drones. He attributes Ukraine’s success with its drones because of the ease of their system which allows private developers to work directly with the military. This promotes rapid prototyping and innovation on the front lines which is a process that is hindered in Russia. When asked about the comparison in drone development of Russian and Ukrainian systems with Chinese systems, he stresses that both countries now are on top of drone development. However, although China produces many of the drone components in these systems, the finished product of these systems is far inferior. In particular, he states that the Chinese lack real wartime experience. China builds weapons that are feel more like toys which lack functionality when they face the rigorousness of real military hardware. The interview delves into specific aspects of drone warfare tactics. Siddegay describes remote mind-laying, where drones drop mines on roads the enemy believes are safe, as an incredibly effective tactic. He also discusses "sleeper drones" or "ambush drones," like those in the Kursk region where a Ukrainian vehicle is destroyed by the drone. This tactic is most effective when using fiber optic drones, because these systems have low energy output and can lie in wait without detection. Although this system has been initially effective, operators adapt quickly to the field changes. Siddegay also elaborates on the "internet bridge" concept, which allows operators based far from the front lines, even in Moscow, to remotely control drones. This reduces the risk to skilled drone pilots, who are often not suited for frontline combat but are invaluable assets. Another topic is the infamous Ukrainian "Babayaga" drone, a heavy agricultural drone repurposed to drop anti-tank mines. These can methodically wipe out fortified areas and bunkers. The Russian military initially dismissed such drones, but they have proven highly effective. As a countermeasure, Russians have been using a machine gun with a thermal scope. They can track drones through the thermal scope and easily hit the drones which have batteries and motors that glow in infared. Now, Russia is responding by developing its own heavy-class drones using Chinese components, but production will take time. He also discussed his take on what he believes will become of drones. He states that the drones will evolve, and that major progress will be seen in autonomous target recognition and guidance, because the jamming systems cause issues. There is an explanation of "Gerundrons" which had Iranian origins, but now have become something new. These systems now has stealth coating. He also shared his thoughts on interceptor drones. He stated that the Ukrainian side has developed these types of drone using Israeli radar systems. These systems have been effectively knocking out Russian drones, which have resulted in the Russians developing countermeasures to deal with these threats. To deal with drones, Siddegay says that from a foot soldier's point of view, anti-droner rounds for rifles, wooded terrain, smart movement, and speed will be most valuable. He dismissed laser systems and said that lasers are somewhat of a joke. In conclusion, Siddegay expresses hope that the Russian government will embrace the private sector’s role in driving innovation in drone technology after the war. He acknowledges the sharp and capable individuals within the Russian defense sector but emphasizes that private companies are inherently more agile and motivated. Although he believes that he will be successful in or out of the drone space, he has a true passion for building military tools in drone development.