这一章节详细描述了1963年涉及经纪公司Ira Haupt & Company的危机，该公司与联合粗炼植物油公司（Allied Crude Vegetable Oil Refining Corporation）的灾难性关联，以及纽约证券交易所（NYSE）前所未有地决定偿还Haupt客户的事件。 危机始于Ira Haupt的管理合伙人莫顿·卡默曼（Morton Kamerman）向纽约证券交易所发出警报，称由于联合公司在植物油期货方面的大规模投机造成的损失，其公司的资本储备已低于要求的水平。 联合公司由安东尼·迪安杰利斯（Anthony DeAngelis）领导，通过Haupt和另一家经纪公司Williston and Bean的信贷，积累了大量的棉籽油和大豆油合约。 油价下跌迫使Haupt向联合公司要求提供额外的现金，但该公司无法提供。 Haupt处境危险，负债累累地为联合公司的投机提供资金，并接受了存储在联合公司贝永仓库中的石油的仓库收据作为抵押品。 风险程度惊人，Haupt向联合公司提供了3700万美元，而该公司的资本仅为800万美元。 当联合公司申请破产，纽约商品交易所暂停棉籽油期货交易时，情况迅速恶化。 事实证明，这些仓库收据大部分是伪造的，它们所代表的石油根本不存在。 这一披露使拥有2万名客户的Haupt陷入了全面的危机，危及了无辜投资者的储蓄。 最初，纽约证券交易所的官员认为Haupt的状况是可以控制的。 但随着欺诈规模变得显而易见，交易所意识到这对Haupt客户的严重影响。 与此同时，肯尼迪总统遇刺的消息使股市陷入暴跌，进一步危及投资者。 纽约证券交易所主席G. Keith Funston意识到这对投资者信心可能造成的灾难性损害，提出了一个非同寻常的解决方案：交易所及其会员公司将偿还Haupt的客户。 Funston说服了主要经纪人，公众福利和股市的稳定取决于这一行动。 纽约证券交易所面临着获得Haupt的债权银行同意的挑战，这些银行被欠3600万美元。 在周末的紧张谈判之后，包括大通曼哈顿银行和摩根担保信托公司在内的银行同意推迟收款工作，允许交易所优先偿还客户。 芝加哥大陆伊利诺伊银行最初犹豫不决，但最终加入了协议，James P. Mahoney（纽约证券交易所成员）被任命为清算人。 与向Haupt贷款550万美元的四家英国银行出现了一个重大障碍。 纽约证券交易所理事古斯塔夫·阿列维（Gustav Allevi）前往伦敦，说服他们参与其中。 这些贷款没有抵押，潜在的回收机会很小。 阿列维成功地说服了英国银行，合作符合他们的最佳利益。 与此同时，面临个人责任的Haupt合伙人将对其公司资产的控制权移交给清算人。 该协议规定，他们应执行授权书，赋予清算人对Haupt事务的完全控制权。 《华尔街日报》记者罗素·沃森（Russell Watson）偶然发现了会议，并很快被带走。 最终，经过艰苦的谈判过程，各方签署了协议。 纽约证券交易所将750万美元存入清算人的账户，并在几个月内，几乎所有Haupt的客户都得到了全额补偿，纽约证券交易所最终支付了950万美元。 纽约证券交易所的行动受到了广泛赞扬。 媒体和约翰逊总统都赞扬交易所对投资者保护的承诺。 获救的客户表示感谢，该协议被视为朝着激发投资者信心和避免潜在市场恐慌迈出的积极一步。 虽然一些会员公司抱怨承担另一家公司的损失，但他们基本上接受了评估。 尽管受到赞扬，纽约证券交易所强调，此举并非先例。 官员们承认，对公共责任的改变态度影响了这一决定。 Ira Haupt 案标志着纽约证券交易所的一个转折点，表明其对投资公众的责任感更强。

This chapter details the 1963 crisis involving the brokerage firm Ira Haupt & Company, its disastrous connection to Allied Crude Vegetable Oil Refining Corporation, and the New York Stock Exchange's (NYSE) unprecedented decision to reimburse Haupt's customers. The crisis began when Morton Kamerman, managing partner of Ira Haupt, alerted the NYSE that his firm's capital reserves fell below required levels due to losses incurred by Allied's massive speculation in vegetable oil futures. Allied, led by Anthony DeAngelis, had amassed vast cottonseed and soybean oil contracts on credit from Haupt and Williston and Bean, another brokerage firm. A drop in oil prices forced Haupt to demand additional cash from Allied, which the company couldn't provide. Haupt, in a dangerously precarious situation, had borrowed heavily to finance Allied's speculations, accepting warehouse receipts for oil stored in Allied's Bayonne tanks as collateral. The extent of the risk was staggering, with Haupt extending $37 million to Allied while the firm's capital only amounted to $8 million. The situation worsened rapidly when Allied filed for bankruptcy, and the New York Produce Exchange suspended trading in cottonseed oil futures. The warehouse receipts, it turned out, were largely forged, and the oil they represented didn't exist. This revelation plunged Haupt, with its 20,000 customers, into a full-blown crisis, jeopardizing the savings of innocent investors. Initially, NYSE officials viewed Haupt's situation as manageable. But as the scale of the fraud became apparent, the exchange realized the dire implications for Haupt's customers. Simultaneously, news of President Kennedy's assassination sent the stock market into a tailspin, further endangering investors. NYSE President G. Keith Funston, recognizing the potential for catastrophic damage to investor confidence, proposed an extraordinary solution: the exchange and its member firms would reimburse Haupt's customers. Funston convinced leading brokers that the public welfare and the stability of the stock market hinged on this action. The NYSE faced the challenge of securing agreement from Haupt's creditor banks, who were owed $36 million. After tense negotiations over the weekend, the banks, including Chase Manhattan and Morgan Guarantee Trust, agreed to defer collection efforts, allowing the exchange to prioritize reimbursing the customers. The Continental Illinois Bank of Chicago initially hesitated, but ultimately joined the agreement, and the liquidator was assigned, which was James P. Mahoney of the NY stock exchange. A significant hurdle arose with the four British banks that had lent $5.5 million to Haupt. Gustav Allevi, an NYSE governor, traveled to London to persuade them to participate. These loans were unsecured and their potential recovery slim. Allevi successfully convinced the British banks that cooperation was in their best interest. Meanwhile, the Haupt partners, facing personal liability, signed over control of their firm's assets to a liquidator. The agreement prescribed that they were to execute powers of attorney, giving a liquidator full control over Haupt's affairs. A Wall Street Journal reporter, Russell Watson, stumbled into the meeting and was quickly escorted out. Finally, after a grueling negotiation process, the parties signed the agreement. The NYSE deposited $7.5 million into an account for the liquidator, and within months, nearly all of Haupt's customers were made whole, with the NYSE ultimately disbursing $9.5 million. The NYSE's actions were widely praised. The media and President Johnson applauded the exchange for its commitment to investor protection. The rescued customers were grateful, and the agreement was seen as a positive step towards inspiring investor confidence and avoiding potential market panic. While some member firms grumbled about covering the losses of another firm, they largely accepted the assessment. Despite the praise, the NYSE stressed that this action wasn't a precedent. Officials acknowledged that changing attitudes towards public responsibility had influenced the decision. The Ira Haupt case marked a turning point for the NYSE, demonstrating a greater sense of accountability to the investing public.