The chapter chronicles the ill-fated journey of the Edsel, a car envisioned by Ford in 1955 amidst a booming economy and a fervent desire to capture the medium-priced market. Ford's intent was to create a distinct vehicle to prevent Ford owners from trading up to competitors' brands like Oldsmobile and Buick. The "Forward Product Planning Committee," led by Richard Craffi, predicted a thriving economy by 1965, where medium-priced cars would dominate sales. Emboldened, Ford allocated a quarter of a billion dollars to the Edsel project.
Roy A. Brown, a Canadian stylist, was tasked with creating a unique design, aiming for distinctiveness while retaining familiarity. Secrecy surrounded the project, with studio doors locked and guarded, although leaks were inevitable due to stylists moving between companies. Craffi meticulously scrutinized every design element, making around 4,000 decisions. The resulting Edsel featured a novel horse-collar-shaped vertical radiator grill, unconventional rear wings, and push-button automatic transmission controls on the steering wheel hub.
David Wallace, the director of planning for market research, was tasked with giving the E-Car a personality and a name. Wallace aimed to create a brand that projected success and aspirational value, engaging Columbia University to conduct surveys in Peoria and San Bernardino to assess perceptions of existing car brands. This research revealed the perceived personalities of Ford, Chevrolet, Buick, and Mercury, leading Wallace to advocate for an Edsel image appealing to younger executives and professional families.
Choosing a name proved problematic. The idea of naming it after Edsel Ford was met with reservations. Various research methods, including soliciting names from the public and even consulting poet Marianne Moore, proved inconclusive. Finally, Ernest R. Breach, acting as the head of the executive committee because the Ford brothers were away, decided to name the car Edsel, despite the team's efforts to find a different name.
The Edsel's launch in September 1957 was accompanied by substantial advertising spending under the direction of Fairfax M. Cone, emphasizing a quiet, self-assured approach. J.C. Larry Doyle, the general sales and marketing manager, recruited a dedicated network of Edsel dealers. Pre-launch publicity generated significant public interest, further amplified by staged events like a press preview showcasing stunt drivers.
However, the Edsel quickly faltered. The car's design, particularly the grill and rear, was criticized. The car was also plagued with quality control issues in its initial production runs, including oil leaks and malfunctioning features. Furthermore, consumer reports gave very negative reviews. This undermined the extensive marketing efforts. As the 1958 recession began to take hold, consumer preferences shifted towards smaller, more economical cars, exacerbating the Edsel's challenges.
Sales plummeted, leading to the consolidation of the Edsel division with Lincoln-Mercury in January 1958. Despite efforts to revive the brand with revised designs in subsequent years, the Edsel never recovered. Production ceased in November 1959, resulting in losses estimated around $350 million.
Former Edsel executives offer various explanations for the failure: bad timing, design flaws, and shifting consumer tastes. Wallace also attributed to the Russian Sputnik launch, which sent a message that the US no longer produced the best technology. There were also reports of dirty work at the plants, and even among dealership owners from Ford and Mercury. Despite the debacle, Ford Motor company, with its many car makes, survived. The Edsel case became a cautionary tale of ambitious ventures gone wrong and the unpredictability of consumer tastes.