这段视频采访了乌特勒支大学的哲学教授汉娜·绍尔，她专门研究道德的进化基础。讨论围绕着通过进化论的视角理解美德和恶习，以及是非对错是否可以被视为我们适应性本质的一种功能。
绍尔强调了在研究道德时纳入进化论视角的重要性，将其视为尼采追溯道德谱系项目的现代方法。她认为，理解我们规范和价值观的起源，可以为判断它们的适宜性以及是否应该拥抱或抛弃它们提供依据。她认为，进化论为这个谱系项目提供了一个强大的框架，提供了科学证据和工具来理解道德的根源。
针对最初对将进化论应用于道德的抵制，绍尔指出，有些人认为这描绘了一幅残酷竞争的黯淡景象，使利他主义和善良显得不可能。然而，她解释说，更深入地理解进化会发现这种冲突仅仅是表面的。"自私基因"的概念，尽管其标题经常被误解，但有助于说明利他主义是如何产生的。基因作为复制实体，驱动有机体关心那些与它们分享基因的亲属，从而导致了利他主义的基本形式。
绍尔进一步探讨了自我牺牲的问题，例如为他人或抽象的事业献出生命。虽然有些情况可能是不适应的，但另一些情况可以通过进化机制来解释，例如拯救自己的后代。她引入了“失灵”的概念，即为特定功能而进化出的特征，即使在无法实现该功能时也会被触发，例如即使使用避孕措施也会产生的性唤起。这个概念有可能解释极端的自我牺牲行为，例如自杀式爆炸袭击，其中为集体而生的英雄主义特质可能会泛化到不再提供生殖益处的情况下。
讨论转向文化在塑造道德中的作用。人类在累积文化方面的能力是独一无二的，每一代都在前一代的知识和技能的基础上发展。这个过程，再加上我们对社会学习的适应性，创造了文化和基因遗传之间的协同进化。文化行为可以影响谁能够繁殖，从而偏向于诸如讲故事或语言技能等特征。绍尔用烹饪的例子来说明这一点，烹饪导致了更小的肠道和更大脑的形成。
关于德性伦理，绍尔认为，在进化论框架内，像诚实这样的个体美德有很大的发挥空间。诚实至关重要，因为人类依赖于他人提供的准确信息，这使得值得信赖成为一种至关重要的品质。她认为，道德哲学中阐述的内在视角最终反映了可以从进化角度加以考察的基本原理。
绍尔提到了人类学上对罪感文化和耻感文化的区分。耻感文化在较小规模的互动中很常见，强调个人声誉，而罪感文化，通常在更大、更复杂的社会中看到，则侧重于具体的行为。
最后，绍尔谈到了道德准则历史上对性的痴迷。她认为，对性的道德化和管制源于其存在的根本重要性，与权力结构、财富和技术交织在一起。关于性的规范在不同社会之间差异很大，表明性行为与更广泛的社会结构灵活地互动。例如，一夫多妻制社会与规范性一夫一妻制形成对比，而后者最终通过更一致的养育环境，对男性、女性和儿童都有益，从而促进了更强的社会学习，进而加速了文化进化。
总而言之，绍尔挑战了道德需要压制我们“基本”本能的观点。她认为这是一种扭曲的观点，受到基督教自我否定传统的驱动。她认为，道德的要求通常与我们的本性和自身利益相符。虽然有时需要延迟满足、纪律和冲动控制，但人类本性与美德之间的冲突在很大程度上是虚幻的。虽然纪律和远见至关重要，但人类本性与美德之间存在根本冲突的观点基本上是不正确的。
The video features an interview with Hannah Sauer, a philosophy professor at the University of Utrecht, who specializes in the evolutionary basis of morality. The discussion revolves around understanding virtues and vices through the lens of evolutionary theory, and whether right and wrong can be seen as a function of our adapted natures.
Sauer emphasizes the importance of incorporating an evolutionary perspective when studying morality, viewing it as a modern approach to Nietzsche's project of tracing the genealogy of morality. She argues that understanding the origins of our norms and values can inform judgments about their desirability and whether they should be embraced or abandoned. Evolutionary theory, she suggests, provides a powerful framework for this genealogical project, offering scientific evidence and tools to understand the roots of morality.
Addressing initial resistance to applying evolutionary theory to morality, Sauer notes that some believed it painted a grim picture of ruthless competition, making altruism and kindness seem impossible. However, she explains that a deeper understanding of evolution reveals that this conflict is merely apparent. The concept of the "selfish gene," despite its often misunderstood title, helps illustrate how altruism can arise. Genes, as copy-making entities, drive organisms to care for relatives who share their genes, leading to basic forms of altruism.
Sauer further explores the question of self-sacrifice, such as giving one's life for others or an abstract cause. While some instances may be maladaptive, others can be explained through evolutionary mechanisms, such as saving one's offspring. She introduces the idea of "misfiring," where traits evolved for a specific function are triggered even when that function cannot be fulfilled, such as sexual arousal even with contraception. This concept can potentially explain extreme acts of self-sacrifice like suicidal bombings, where the trait of heroism for the group may generalize to situations where it no longer provides reproductive benefits.
The discussion transitions to the role of culture in shaping morality. Humans are unique in their capacity for cumulative culture, where each generation builds upon the knowledge and skills of the previous one. This process, combined with our aptitude for social learning, creates a co-evolution between cultural and genetic inheritance. Cultural behaviors can influence who reproduces, favoring traits like storytelling or language skills. Sauer illustrates this with the example of cooking, which led to smaller guts and the development of larger brains.
Regarding virtue ethics, Sauer argues there's ample room for individual virtues like honesty within an evolutionary framework. Honesty is vital because humans depend on accurate information from others, making trustworthiness a crucial trait. She posits that the internal perspectives articulated in moral philosophy are ultimately reflections of rationales that can be examined from an evolutionary standpoint.
Sauer touches upon the anthropological distinction between guilt cultures and shame cultures. Shame cultures, common in smaller-scale interactions, emphasize personal reputation, while guilt cultures, often seen in larger, more complex societies, focus on specific actions.
Finally, Sauer addresses the historical preoccupation of moral codes with sex. She suggests that the moralization and policing of sex stems from its existential importance, intertwined with power structures, wealth, and technology. Norms regarding sexuality can vary widely across societies, indicating the flexible interaction of sexual behavior with broader social structures. Polygynous societies, for instance, contrast with the norm of normative monogamy, which ultimately proved beneficial for both men, women and children through a more consistent nurturing environment, fostering enhanced social learning in turn accelerating cultural evolution.
In conclusion, Sauer challenges the notion that morality requires suppressing our "base" instincts. She argues that this is a distorted view, driven by Christian traditions of self-negation. She suggests that the demands of morality are typically in harmony with our nature and self-interest. There are times when there is delayed gratification, discipline and impulse control required, but mostly conflict between human nature and virtue is largely illusory. While discipline and foresight are essential, the idea of a fundamental conflict between human nature and virtue is largely incorrect.