芝加哥大学的史蒂夫·平克斯（Steve Pincus）发表了一场讲座，探讨了英帝国的悖论，重点在于解释为什么英国在1760年代至1780年代期间在南亚获得了帝国，却失去了其北美殖民地。他还探讨了英帝国的矛盾本质，以及占主导地位的帝国解读模式是否能解释其矛盾。 平克斯批判了两种流行的解读模式。第一种是“新自由主义”解读，认为帝国国家软弱且放任，无法解释殖民地叛乱或奴隶制固有的强制性。第二种是“庶民研究”或“后殖民”模式，将帝国视为主要是掠夺性的，但这无法解释相对包容的政治制度的发展，或者前英国殖民地与其他地区相比更高的财富。 他挑战了“公司国家”的论点，该论点声称由于国家干预有限，英国帝国由公司有效管理。平克斯反驳说，公司国家需要国家合作和军事支持，尤其是在南亚。他还认为，“帝国到民族国家”的叙述，将帝国描绘成过时的，不可避免地会被民族国家取代，是有问题的。他指出，美国《独立宣言》的重点是乔治三世的暴政，而不是帝国结构本身，以及莫卧儿帝国在南亚被英帝国取代。 平克斯提倡一种比较的方法，将英国帝国置于全球帝国的更广泛背景下，以理解它们的持久性质，并挑战帝国本质上不如私营公司有效率或不如民族国家有道德的观点。他将帝国定义为跨越差异进行统治的国家，与致力于文化和民族同质化的民族国家形成对比。 讲座随后讨论了英国帝国国家出现的三个阶段。首先，爱尔兰是一个关键但失败的试验场，揭示了英国帝国国家形成中的问题。其次，党派之争和帝国是共同构成（co-constitutive）的，党派政治的出现是为了争论如何最好地管理帝国。最后，一种持续的帝国模式得以确立，无法被描述为从“第一”帝国到“第二”帝国的转变。他认为，爱尔兰的经验表明，如果不将其纳入更大的帝国框架，就无法持续统治。 他分析了英国党派政治的出现，指出英帝国因其广泛的民众讨论和权力分散的异议（decentralized dissent）而与众不同，这与其他帝国形成对比。他确定了两个主要的党派团体：托利党（Tories），他们倾向于通过领土扩张和殖民地掠夺来使英国地主阶级受益；辉格爱国者（Whig Patriots），他们主张通过贸易和邦联治理来使所有帝国臣民受益。 他挑战了19世纪英国帝国从第一帝国到第二帝国发生根本性转变的观点，认为市场全球化开始得更早，并且存在一个强大而理性的帝国国家。他认为，托利党的胜利导致了在北美征税和从印度提取资源等政策，以偿还国债。他说，这加剧了异议，使得英国人投资印度比投资美洲更有价值。 总而言之，平克斯将美国革命解释为一场帝国国内战争的一部分，而不是一场民族主义叛乱，这场战争始于17世纪，并持续到1770年代和1780年代。他断言，认真对待帝国需要重新配置国际关系分析，以考虑国家间关系，并认识到党派之争在国家形成中的作用。他坚称，一场反复出现的帝国国内战争，发生在领土主义者和商业主义者之间，孟买卡格温叛乱（Cagwyn's rebellion）等事件就是例证，这场战争塑造了英帝国的演变。他还提出，人们的叛乱与其说是为了“民族主义”，不如说是为了另一个不同的帝国。

Steve Pincus from the University of Chicago presents a lecture exploring the paradox of the British Empire, focusing on why Britain gained an empire in South Asia while losing its North American colonies between the 1760s and 1780s. He also explores the contradictory nature of the British Empire and whether the dominant modes of interpreting the empire can explain its contradictions. Pincus critiques two prevalent interpretive models. The first, a "neoliberal" interpretation, posits a weak and permissive imperial state, failing to explain colonial rebellion or chattel slavery's inherent coercion. The second, a "subaltern studies" or "post-colonial" mode, views the empire as primarily extractive, which doesn't account for the development of relatively inclusive political institutions or the higher wealth of former British colonies compared to others. He challenges the "company states" argument, which asserts that the British Empire was efficiently managed by companies due to limited state intervention. Pincus counters that company states required state cooperation and military support, particularly in South Asia. He also argues that the "empire-to-nation-state" narrative, portraying empires as outdated and inevitably replaced by nation-states, is problematic. He points to the American Declaration of Independence's focus on the tyranny of George III rather than the imperial structure itself, and the replacement of the Mughal Empire with the British Empire in South Asia. Pincus advocates for a comparative approach, situating the British Empire within the broader context of global empires to understand their enduring nature and challenges the notion that empires were inherently less efficient than private companies or less ethical than nation-states. He defines empires as states that govern across difference, contrasting them with nation-states that strive for cultural and ethnic homogeneity. The lecture then discusses three phases in the emergence of the British imperial state. First, Ireland served as a crucial but failed testing ground, revealing problems in British imperial state formation. Second, partisanship and empire were co-constitutive, with party politics emerging as a debate about how to best govern the empire. Finally, a persistent imperial pattern was established, resisting characterization as a shift from a "first" to a "second" empire. He argues that Ireland's experience demonstrated the unsustainability of governing it without integrating it into a larger imperial framework. He analyzes the emergence of party politics in Britain, noting that the British Empire was unique for its widespread popular discussion and decentralized dissent, in contrast to empires. He identifies two main partisan groups: Tories, who favored benefiting the English landed classes through territorial acquisition and colonial extraction, and Whig Patriots, who advocated for benefiting all imperial subjects through trade and confederal governance. He challenges the notion of a fundamental shift from a first to a second British Empire in the 19th century, arguing that market globalization began much earlier and that a strong, rational imperial state existed. He argues that the Tory victory led to policies like taxation in North America and extracting resources from India, to pay down national debt. This, he says, fueled dissent, making it more worthwhile for the British to invest in India than in the Americas. In conclusion, Pincus interprets the American Revolution as part of an imperial civil war, not a nationalist rebellion, which began in the 17th century and continued through the 1770s and 1780s. He asserts that taking empires seriously requires reconfiguring international relations analysis to consider interstate relations and recognizing the role of partisanship in state formation. He insists that a recurring imperial civil war between territorialists and commercialists, exemplified by episodes like Cagwyn's rebellion in Bombay, shaped the evolution of the British Empire. He also proposes that it wasn't so much that people were rebelling for "nationalism" but the name of another, different, empire.