这节讲座深入探讨了人道主义干预备受争议的历史，并将 2011 年的利比亚干预作为核心案例进行研究。它首先描绘了一幅利比亚干预后黯淡的现实图景：混乱、民兵战争、流离失所的人口和一个失败的国家。讲座旨在揭示这种崩溃是如何以及为何发生的，并考察其对未来人道主义干预、中东稳定以及美国在全球舞台上发挥善行力量的能力的影响。 讲座随后回顾了“保护责任”（R2P）原则。这一原则是在卢旺达和科索沃的失败之后提出的，倡导国家有责任保护其人口免受种族灭绝、战争罪、种族清洗和危害人类罪的侵害。2005 年的联合国世界首脑会议成果文件进一步承诺，当各国未能履行这一责任时，国际社会应采取集体行动。 教授随后考察了 2011 年的阿拉伯之春，这场起义被广泛误解为一系列相互关联的民主革命在中东蔓延。这种误读助长了西方国家对利比亚等国政权更迭的热情支持。 讲座强调，在埃及，这些运动背后的军队，由穆巴拉克等人领导，已经与腐败联系在一起，并最终决定支持阿拉伯之春，以摆脱穆巴拉克政权。在利比亚，教授认为，情况是一场内战，而不是一场民众起义。联合国安理会授权干预以保护平民，但法国在最初支持反对派后，推动了更具侵略性的干预，旨在实现政权更迭。 讲座质疑了有关班加西即将发生大规模屠杀平民的说法，并指出有报告表明这是假新闻。讲座随后揭示了奥巴马政府内部关于干预的分歧。罗伯特·盖茨、乔·拜登和其他人反对这项行动。希拉里·克林顿、苏珊·赖斯和萨曼莎·鲍尔支持该决议。辩论最终以奥巴马同意采取“幕后领导”战略告终，本质上是允许法国和其他盟友发挥主导作用，而美国则提供支持。 北约扩大了其职权范围，实际上追求政权更迭，尽管非洲联盟和阿拉伯联盟试图斡旋停火。教授认为，干预虽然成功地推翻了卡扎菲政权，但由于缺乏有效的和平建设和对敌对民兵的授权，导致了一个失败的国家。这给整个地区带来了影响，助长了马里和叙利亚的冲突。讲座强调了干预的道德风险与叙利亚的关系，以及人们相信外部力量会干预来帮助他们，从而进行反抗的观点。 此外，利比亚的不稳定加剧了欧洲难民危机，助长了反建制政党的崛起。讲者强调，尽管最初的意图是促进民主和人权，但结果是毁灭性的，质疑了“保护责任”原则的有效性和合法性。 讲座从利比亚吸取了教训，主张以谨慎的态度对待“保护责任”，应具有特殊情况、干预的高门槛、比例性地使用武力，以及将政权更迭作为最后手段。必须更加重视预防危机，例如及早干预乍得等国，这将最大限度地降低重蹈利比亚灾难的风险。美国影响力的减弱，加上俄罗斯在该地区势力的扩张，进一步使全球局势复杂化。

This lecture delves into the controversial history of humanitarian intervention, using the Libyan intervention of 2011 as a central case study. It starts by painting a bleak picture of Libya's post-intervention reality: chaos, militia warfare, displaced populations, and a failed state. The lecture aims to uncover how and why this disintegration happened, examining the implications for future humanitarian interventions, the Middle East's stability, and the United States' ability to act as a force for good on the global stage. The lecture then revisits the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) doctrine. This doctrine emerged in the wake of failures in Rwanda and Kosovo, advocating for a state's duty to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The UN World Summit Outcome document of 2005 further committed the international community to taking collective action when states fail in this responsibility. The professor then examines the Arab Spring of 2011, where the uprising was widely misinterpreted as a series of interconnected democratic revolutions spreading across the Middle East. This misreading contributed to the West's enthusiastic support for regime change in countries like Libya. The lecture highlights that in Egypt, the military behind these movements, led by figures such as Mubarak, had become associated with corruption, and ultimately decided to support the Arab Spring to rid themselves of the Mubarak regime. In Libya, the professor argues, the situation was a civil war rather than a popular uprising. The UN Security Council authorized intervention to protect civilians, but France pushed for a more aggressive intervention aimed at regime change after initially backing the opposition. The lecture questions the narrative of an imminent slaughter of civilians in Benghazi, pointing out reports showed to be fake news. The lecture then reveals a split within the Obama administration regarding intervention. Robert Gates, Joe Biden, and others were against the action. Hillary Clinton, Susan Rice, and Samantha Power supported the resolution. The debate culminated in Obama agreeing to a "leading from behind" strategy, essentially allowing France and other allies to take the lead, while the US supported. NATO expanded its remit, effectively pursuing regime change, despite African Union and Arab League attempts to mediate a ceasefire. The professor argues that the intervention, successful in removing Gaddafi, resulted in a failed state due to a lack of effective peace-building and the empowerment of rival militias. This had repercussions across the region, fueling conflicts in Mali and Syria. The lecture highlights the concept of the moral hazard of intervention in relation to Syria, and the idea that people, believing external forces will intervene to help them, engage in revolt. Furthermore, Libya's instability has exacerbated the European refugee crisis, contributing to the rise of anti-establishment parties. The lecturer highlights that despite the initial intentions of promoting democracy and human rights, the outcome has been devastating, questioning the effectiveness and legitimacy of R2P. The lecture draws lessons from Libya, advocating for a cautious approach to R2P, with exceptional circumstances, high thresholds for intervention, proportional use of force, and regime change as a last resort. A stronger focus on preventing crises is necessary, exemplified by early intervention in countries like Chad, and this will minimize the risk of repeating the Libyan catastrophe. America's diminished influence, coupled with Russia's expanded presence in the region, further complicate the global landscape.