这段文字深入探讨了西方民主国家右翼政治的复兴，追溯其根源到20世纪70年代末和80年代初，以罗纳德·里根和玛格丽特·撒切尔为代表人物，并探讨了促成这一转变的各种复杂因素之间的相互作用。 讲座以里根的“福利女王”讲话开始，强调了他对福利国家和战后社会保障共识的攻击。这种共识以累进税制、再分配和强大的社会安全网为特征，几十年来一直享有两党支持。里根的崛起挑战了这一点，他主张放松管制、减少政府干预，以及对工会和累进税制的敌视。虽然最初被低估，但里根和撒切尔成功地开创了一个新自由主义政策的时代。 令人惊讶的是，共产主义的崩溃并没有像许多知识分子最初预测的那样使左倾政党受益。人们原本期望，消除共产主义的“妖怪”会使社会民主主义更受欢迎，并允许对社会项目进行更多投资。然而，这种观点未能考虑到支撑战后福利国家的人口、经济和地缘政治现实。人口老龄化、美国财政支持减少以及伊斯兰原教旨主义等新的“妖怪”带来了新的挑战。与共产主义不同，伊斯兰原教旨主义对资本主义不构成系统性威胁，从而减少了通过强大的福利项目来“收买”工人阶级不满情绪的动机。 讲座的核心转向对分配政治的更深入分析，并以“小王子”的比喻来说明。收入分配的形状表明，中位数收入总是低于平均收入，这可能会导致民主国家向下再分配。然而，这种情况并非总是发生。这个难题引出了对各种理论的讨论。其中一种理论认为，由于存在经济利益之外的其他维度，例如种族或社会问题，中位数选民定理不足以解释缺乏向下再分配的现象。这些次要维度可能在选民的决策中超过经济因素的考虑，导致像尼克松的“南方战略”这样的结果。 另一个提出的理论框架是“多数规则分割美元游戏”，突出了分配政治中固有的不稳定性。任何现有的分配都可能受到新多数联盟的挑战和推翻，而这种联盟是由纯粹的自身利益驱动的（无论这种利益是自私的还是慈善的）。这表明，仅靠利益不足以维持任何特定的分配，即使是向下再分配。为了实现团结和对向下再分配的有效需求，需要共同的理想和强大的机构。 然后，公正性作为一个理想受到审查。卷尾猴的实验表明，不公平感通常源于当地参照群体内的比较，而不是全球范围内的财富比较。“公正”的概念本质上是主观和相对的。不仅仅是一些人拥有的少，而是他们是否受到平等的对待。 公平的竞争叙事通过实例进一步说明：里根的自我参照比较（“你现在比四年前更好了吗？”）与对最富者和最贫者之间差距扩大的担忧形成对比。这突出了绝对改善和相对不平等之间的紧张关系。虽然存在基于团结和更公平分配的论点，但这种联盟容易分裂。承诺绝对收益或解决联盟中某些部分的具体损失通常足以扰乱更广泛的运动。 讲座最后考虑了机构，特别是工会，作为团结政治的潜在锚点。然而，自20世纪中期以来，工会会员人数急剧下降。与此同时，不平等现象急剧上升。从制造业向服务业的转变、自由贸易以及资本流动性的增加，使得维持工会变得更加困难。这种下降削弱了左翼倡导再分配政策的能力。最后，讲座认为，两党制可能比多党制更少进行再分配，因为中间偏左的政党与工会运动的联系较少，从而减少了对再分配的需求。

This transcript delves into the resurgence of right-wing politics in Western democracies, tracing its roots to the late 1970s and early 1980s with figures like Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and exploring the complex interplay of factors contributing to this shift. The lecture begins with Reagan's "welfare queen" speech, highlighting the attack on the welfare state and the post-war consensus of social protection. This consensus, characterized by progressive taxation, redistribution, and strong social safety nets, enjoyed bipartisan support for decades. Reagan's rise challenged this, advocating for deregulation, reduced government intervention, and hostility towards trade unions and progressive taxation. While initially underestimated, Reagan and Thatcher successfully ushered in an era of neoliberal policies. The collapse of communism, surprisingly, did not benefit left-leaning parties as many intellectuals initially predicted. The expectation was that the removal of the communist "bogeyman" would make social democracy more palatable and allow for greater investment in social programs. However, this perspective failed to account for the demographic, economic, and geopolitical realities underpinning post-war welfare states. Aging populations, reduced American financial support, and the rise of new "bogeymen" like Islamic fundamentalism created new challenges. Unlike communism, Islamic fundamentalism poses no systemic threat to capitalism, reducing the incentive to "buy off" working-class discontent through robust welfare programs. The core of the lecture shifts to a more analytical discussion of distributive politics, illustrated by the analogy of "The Little Prince". The income distribution's shape demonstrates that the median income is always below the mean, potentially leading to downward redistribution in democracies. However, this doesn't always happen. This puzzle leads to a discussion of various theories. One suggests that the median voter theorem is insufficient in explaining the lack of downward redistribution due to the presence of other dimensions beyond economic interests, such as race or social issues. These secondary dimensions can outweigh economic considerations in voters' decisions, leading to outcomes like Nixon's "Southern Strategy." Another theoretical framework presented is the "majority rule divided dollar game," highlighting the inherent instability in distributive politics. Any existing distribution can be challenged and overturned by a new majority coalition, driven by pure self-interest (regardless if that interest is selfish or philanthropic). This suggests that interest alone is insufficient to maintain any particular distribution, even downward redistribution. To achieve solidarity and effective demand for downward redistribution, shared ideals and strong institutions are necessary. Fairness, as an ideal, is then scrutinized. The capuchin monkey experiment reveals that a sense of inequity often arises from comparisons within a local reference group, rather than a global comparison of wealth. The idea of "fairness" is inherently subjective and relative. It's not simply that some have less, it's whether they are treated equally. The competing narratives of fairness are further illustrated through examples: Reagan's self-referential comparison ("Are you better off than you were four years ago?") contrasted with concerns about the widening gap between the richest and poorest. This highlights the tension between absolute improvements and relative inequality. While arguments based on solidarity and a more equitable distribution exist, such coalitions are vulnerable to splintering. Promising absolute gains or addressing specific losses to segments of the coalition is often enough to disrupt the broader movement. The lecture concludes by considering institutions, particularly trade unions, as potential anchors for solidaristic politics. However, union membership has declined dramatically since the mid-20th century. This has been accompanied by a sharp rise in inequality. The shift from a manufacturing to a service-based economy, free trade, and increased capital mobility have made it more difficult to sustain unionization. This decline undermines the capacity for the left to advocate for redistributive policies. Finally, the lecture suggests that two-party systems may be less redistributive than multi-party systems, as the left of center party is less connected to union movements, creating less demand for redistribution.