莎拉·佩恩发表了一场讲座，剖析了冷战时期俄罗斯、美国、中国与印度和巴基斯坦之间复杂的地缘政治动态。她将她的演讲构建成一场游戏，识别出塑造南亚格局的关键决策、联盟和有限战争。 佩恩指出了三个关键时刻。首先，毛泽东在20世纪40年代末和50年代初征服新疆和西藏，消除了中国和印度之间的缓冲带，导致领土争端并改变了力量平衡。其次，艾森豪威尔政府的“巴基斯坦迷恋”，与巴基斯坦结成军事联盟以对抗苏联，却无意中毒化了美印关系，并造成了长期的失衡。第三，1964年后的中苏分裂，当时拥有核武器的毛泽东对苏联的领土收益和意识形态差异表示不满，将彼此转变为主要对手，而不是美国。 讲座随后分析了各国之间不断变化的忠诚度。虽然斯大林最初对尼赫鲁抱有鄙视，但赫鲁晓夫将印度视为对抗中国的力量。尼赫鲁信奉费边社会主义，并对美国的种族隔离感到震惊，尽管他宣称奉行不结盟政策，但他还是倾向于俄罗斯。中国1962年与印度的战争，旨在控制西藏，导致了永久的敌意和印度的军事建设。巴基斯坦目睹了中国与印度的裂痕，看到了结盟的机会，尤其是在核发展方面。 佩恩强调了美国在南亚面临的内在挑战，即美国与印度或巴基斯坦都没有共同的主要敌人，这造成了僵局。美国与巴基斯坦结盟是因为其靠近苏联的战略位置，建立了关键的监听站。然而，这种关系不时受到冷遇、武器禁运和紧张关系的困扰，而当监听站变得至关重要时，例如在U-2飞行期间，这些关系又会变得重要。巴基斯坦领导人对与美国的关系感到失望，因为这种关系在具有战略意义时至关重要，而在没有共同利益时则变得有问题。另一方面，印度对美国的种族隔离政策、资本主义意识形态以及对殖民势力的支持感到不满。 佩恩解释说，1971年孟加拉国独立战争进一步复杂化了局势。美国为了实现与中国关系正常化，对巴基斯坦残酷镇压孟加拉民族主义者保持沉默。作为回应，印度与俄罗斯签署了一项军事条约，并提升了与北越的关系。 转向地缘政治游戏中的“行动”，佩恩概述了国家力量的工具。1960年的印度河水条约等外交努力，这是一项对印度和巴基斯坦都有利的具有里程碑意义的协议，但美国并未获得持久的感激。 美国未能利用外交手段让印度和巴基斯坦搁置分歧，因为他们无法看到自己有任何共同点。 美国试图利用经济援助来影响印度和巴基斯坦。美国提供的援助比俄罗斯或中国都多，但两国都更喜欢与中国和俄罗斯结盟。佩恩强调的一个负面国家力量工具是军事援助。美国未能校准军事援助，疏远一个国家，同时支持另一个国家，无意中助长了核扩散。其他行动，比如派遣航母战斗群进入孟加拉湾，只会加剧紧张局势。 讲座强调了“冻结冲突”的危险，例如克什米尔，外部行为者在那里助长叛乱，导致长期苦难和抑制经济增长。她用此作为案例研究，说明否决行为者如何造成长期冲突。佩恩最后敦促决策者根据主要对手、生存威胁和地理位置分析结盟。她强调了重新评估的重要性，关注可解决的问题，并认识到较小力量联合行动以影响全球事务的潜力。

Sarah Payne delivers a lecture dissecting the complex geopolitical dynamics of Russia, the United States, and China's interactions with India and Pakistan during the Cold War era. Framing her presentation as a game, she identifies pivotal decisions, alliances, and limited wars that shaped the landscape of South Asia. Payne identifies three critical junctures. First, Mao Zedong's conquest of Xinjiang and Tibet in the late 1940s and early 1950s, which eliminated the buffer zone between China and India, leading to territorial disputes and altering the power dynamic. Second, the Eisenhower administration's "Pak-Domania," forging a military alliance with Pakistan to counter the Soviet Union, inadvertently poisoned US-Indian relations and created a long-term imbalance. Third, the Sino-Soviet split after 1964, when Mao, now armed with nuclear weapons, voiced grievances against Soviet territorial gains and ideological differences, transforming each other as primary adversaries rather than the US. The lecture then analyzes the shifting allegiances among the nations. While Stalin initially viewed Nehru with disdain, Khrushchev saw India as a counterweight to China. Nehru, favoring Fabian socialism and appalled by US segregation, leaned towards Russia despite a professed non-aligned stance. China's 1962 war with India, which was designed to control Tibet, led to permanent animosity and India's military buildup. Pakistan, witnessing China's rift with India, saw an opportunity for alliance, especially in nuclear development. Payne highlights the inherent challenges for the United States in South Asia, lacking a shared primary enemy with either India or Pakistan, creating a stalemate. The US aligned with Pakistan due to its strategic location near the Soviet Union, establishing crucial listening posts. However, this relationship was punctuated by periods of disinterest, arms embargoes, and a strained relationship which were punctuated by moments when listening posts became critical, such as during U-2 flights. The Pakistani leadership became disillusioned with the US relationship which swung from crucial for its location to problematic when it didn't have shared interests. India, on the other hand, bristled at US segregation policies, capitalist ideology, and perceived support for colonial powers. The 1971 Bangladesh War of Independence, Payne explains, further complicated matters. The US, seeking to normalize relations with China, remained silent on Pakistan's brutal suppression of Bengali nationalists. India, in response, signed a military pact with Russia and upgraded ties with North Vietnam. . Moving to "plays" in the geopolitical game, Payne outlines instruments of national power. Diplomatic efforts like the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, a landmark agreement beneficial to both India and Pakistan, yielded no lasting gratitude for the US. The US was unable to use diplomacy to get India and Pakistan to set aside their differences because they were not able to see themselves as having any common ground. The US tried to use economic aid to influence India and Pakistan. The US provided more aid than Russia or China, but both countries preferred being aligned with China and Russia. A negative instrument of national power Payne highlights is military aid. The US failed to calibrate military aid, alienating one nation while supporting the other, and inadvertently fueled nuclear proliferation. Other actions, like sending carrier battle groups into the Bay of Bengal, only heightened tensions. The lecture underscores the dangers of "frozen conflicts," such as Kashmir, where external actors fuel insurgencies, leading to prolonged suffering and inhibiting economic growth. She uses this as a case study for how veto actors can create extended conflicts. Payne concludes by urging policymakers to analyze alignments based on primary adversaries, existential threats, and geographic proximity. She emphasizes the importance of reassessment, focusing on solvable problems, and recognizing the potential of smaller powers acting in unison to influence global affairs.